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Abstract
Fieldwork in Cuernavaca, Mexico is used to explore the conditions under
which firms are compelled to remain informal or formal, and in some cases why
they function in between. This approach is helpful in directing attention to a
phenomenon not ordinarily examined by economists and planners.
Understanding why in some cases' firms remain informal, and in other cases
formal, serves as tool for formulating different policies for various occupations
within the informal sector.
Interviews and time spent with informal sector participants showed that
informality is not so much a question of legality, but rahter a continuum. In
this sense, it became evident that formal firms also engage in illegal transactions
that points to a more varied and complex situation.
In this respect, some of the major findings are that people who engage in
informal activities for survival tend to operate in situations of total illegality
because their activities tend to be unstable and, therefore less profitable.
However, when we look at the types of activities that the middle and upper
classes engage in, the degree of legality appears to increase. The middle and
upper class tend to participate in activities that are more visible to authorities. In
addition, my finding suggests that for the poor, tax evasion does not explain why
they place themselves under extreme conditions to make ends meet. In this
connection, the study concludes by asking who benefits from a particular
political-economic order and what is the relationship of that order to the origins
of informal sector participation?
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Introduction
My main hypothesis is that the degree of "informality-formality" is
directly related to the nature of tasks that is performed within the firm.1 In other
words, the degree of compliance with legal provisions is related to the activity of
the firm. A secondary hypothesis is that the more visible the activities in terms
of transactions and contact with other firms or the general public, the higher the
degree of formality.
From the above we can make three general points which, in my view, are
neglected in the literature. First, the study of the informal sector should not be
framed in terms of legality or illegality, where activities that are considered
"legal" belong to the formal sector, while those that are considered "illegal" fall
within the informal sector.2 It has become clearer to scholars recently that in the
developing world - as a result of endemic macroeconomic instability, poorly
institutionalized decision making processes, inefficient and intrusive
bureaucracies, institutionalized corruption, and the like - even those economic
actors who are unambiguous participants in the formal sectors engage in
instances of informal activity. Thus there is always some mixture. In most of
the developing world, we are not dealing with instances or situations of
either/or, but rather a continuum whereby some activities fall more to one end
of the legal-illegal spectrum and others toward the other end. I specify in this
study which groups and which activities we should expect to see more at one
end or the other. I specify the conditions, motives, and incentives that generate
behavior along the continuum.
Second, informality should not, therefore, be equated with the poor and
the indigent. The middle and upper classes have always been active participants
in the informal sector, even if most of the activities fall more on the legal end of
the spectrum or their informal participation may display more discontinuity and
brevity. Their informal activities may at times be disguised as formal
transactions because of their material resources, access to political power, and
1 The term firm refers to activities which employ between one to five persons. This fits the
definition that PREALC has been using since 1975.
2 Throughout this thesis, the term informal sector refers to a collection of very different types of
activity. It should not be interpreted as necessarily denoting either homogeneity or weak formal-
informal linkages (Booth, J: IDB, 1994).
connections to other actors possessing political and economic power.
Furthermore, the conditions and motivations for their participation in the
informal sector are in sharp contrast to those of the lower classes, in that the
middle and upper classes engage in informal activites so as to supplement their
income. The study of informality, therefore, becomes more than a mere
question of poverty alleviation or economic development, but a question of
power and wealth disparities, of domination and distribution, a question of who
benefits from a particular political-economic order and what is the relationship
of that order to the origins of informal sector participation?
Thirdly, as suggested above, informality should not be equated with tax
evasion, for the incentives and motivations of actors differ according to their
socioeconomic status, their product types, location, among other factors. In brief,
the participation of the poor may be categorized as "survival-seeking." That is,
their participation in the informal sector is geared toward meeting basic needs.
The participation of the middle and upper classes can be categorized as "income-
enhancing," whereby the motive is for income above and beyond basic needs. In
rough form, I have found that the more the activity (more precisely the
individuals and the entire range of their economic activities) can be defined as
survival-seeking, the more likely it is to be informal; while income-enhancing
activities will fall on the formal end.
In the first chapter I present the informal sector debate that began in the
1970's and end with the 1990's. At the outset of this chapter we look at the work
of Keith Hart to help us understand his distinction between formality and
informality. At the same time we examine the question of what is informal
economic activity? Then we engage in the debate that began in the 1970's.
The second chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of
operating illegally with the bulk of the evidence drawn from Cuernavaca. The
aim is to provide some plausible explanations as to why those in the informal
sector do not always fulfill the many laws and obligations that are required by
their local authorities. In particular, the chapter looks at reasons other than tax
evasion which can possibly explain the existence of informal activities. My
analysis focuses on the other reasons for explaining the existence of informal
activities, such as limited access to formal credit, fluctuating business location,
and restricted political power.
In the third chapter I present evidence which suggests that the informal
sector encompasses more than just the poor. Attention is given to questions
such as who is involved in the informal sector? How? At what level and for
what reasons? It seeks to explain participants motives which I think are
inherently dependent on the types of political and economic connections that
they have. Each chapter ends with some final comments and recommendations.
The next section explains how I was able to obtain information that I am going to
present in the chapters that I have just outlined.
The origin of this thesis is easy to date. In January 1992 I visited
Cuernavaca, Mexico for the first time to participate in an intensive study abroad
program on the political economy and culture of Mexico.
Two days after my arrival I went to a restaurant called Las MaRanitas,
about which I had heard so many good things. For example, the family I was
staying with told me that there was no other restaurant like it in Cuernavaca,
and that I must go there before my trip ends. Arthur, my instructor on this trip
said that my host family was correct, and that I should definitely visit the
restaurant. What was troublesome is that neither my host family nor Arthur
had told me anything specific about this restaurant. This brought a lot of
questions to mind.
My roommate David decided to join me for dinner that night. We came
out of the house and stood on the sidewalk hoping that a cab would come our
way soon. We waved our hands at what appeared to be a taxi. When the driver
stopped we asked him how much he would charge to take us to restaurant. He
said 7 pesos but we talked him down to 5 pesos. For anyone familiar with Mexico
this was the customary thing to do. Never get into a cab unless a price has been
negotiated.
When we got to the restaurant everyone began looking in our direction,
even though we had not exited the cab. As David and I approached the main
entrance to the restaurant everyone in our presence became motionless. It did
not take long to solve the puzzle. The problem was that we were the only ones
to arrive by taxi while everyone else was arriving by limousine. Nonetheless, we
were both greeted politely and drawn to a table in the courtyard filled with lit
candles.
The restaurant was tranquil. From its well defined courtyard, one could
see the stars and the clouds drifting away. Wine glasses stood out on every table,
making it more impossible for us to resist ordering a bottle of wine. After all we
did not want others to know the real truth about us, which is to say neither
David nor I could really afford a bottle of wine. By the time we finished our first
and only bottle of wine a couple next to our table had already sipped three bottles
of their favorite wine. The thought of having a second bottle of wine came to
our mind, but we figured that our first bottle of wine had made a big dent on our
pockets. At this point we were very hungry, but we only had enough money to
get some appetizers. This particular night I had seen the one side of Mexico I did
not expect to see on my trip.
The next day I went to the main cathedral to meet with my group. As we
stood in the main court of the cathedral paying close attention to our guide, three
young girls came to us asking if we wanted to buy some candy. The Bishop told
them to leave us alone. As I reached into my pocket our guide told me that what
I was about to do was a bad idea. I did not know what he was trying to get at until
a group of about ten children came running to me. They formed a circle around
me and began holding onto my shirt and belt so that I could not escape. They
insisted I buy something from them. Arthur came to my rescue immediately
and said to me "when are you going to realize that you alone cannot solve these
people's problems?"
After our visit with the Bishop we headed toward Caf4 Universal to get
something to eat and have some beer. After being in the restaurant for no longer
than five minutes two Indian men whom I imagined were in their late 50's or so
approached us with their baskets. They were not any different than the children
that I encountered that morning. By the looks on their faces and bare feet I could
tell that they had been walking for a long time hoping that some generous
tourist would relieve them of the weight that they had been carrying. That
afternoon I came home with two large baskets.
Later I grew depressed and upset with the events that had transpired that
day. First, I was upset with myself for not having paid a fair price for the two
baskets that I had purchased. In this sense, I came to the realization that tourists
like myself are very much a part of the way people live elsewhere. Second, I
began asking myself whether or not peoples' lives were meant to be the way I
had seen on that day. This particular question took me back to my childhood
years. As I looked backed, I began to realize that the only thing which made me
different from the people I had come in contact with was that I had been raised in
a society where opportunity actually existed for me to exercise my potential.
Though I was born and raised in an impoverished country, it was not
until I went to Cuernavaca, Mexico that I began to question the notion of
poverty. I did not question it while growing up because many of the people who
I grew up with, especially my family, thought that life itself was meant to be
difficult. Moreover, as I continued to reflect on my past experiences it became
clear to me that the majority of people who live in poverty and were born in it
think that their past generations are the ones to blame. Little did these people
know that the reason why they are poor is because the very few who control our
society are the ones responsible for keeping them impoverished. In this sense,
the majority of us who live on the other side know that the bottom line of
Capitalism is that one must "have", and for this to we undoubtedly end up with
the "have-nots". These things not only helped shape my views on global
politics, but they also led me to understand why the vast majority of people
living in "Third-World" countries have to resort to different methods of making
a living other than going to the factory.
That same year I was accepted to MIT's graduate program in planning
where I hoped to become more familiar with the concept of urban informal
sector. In reading literature on the informal sector I became more confused with
the ideas and interpretations of authors who wrote on the subject. For example,
the most frequent tendency was to equate poverty with the informal sector.
That is- only poor people take part in the informal sector. The more
conservative writers explained that the reason why people choose to participate
in the informal sector is because they wish to evade tax and labor regulations.
Those in the center wrote that it is because of poor wage and working conditions
that are found in the formal sector that people choose to engage in the informal
sector.
As I continued to read other people's research it became clear to me that
the only way I was going to deal with this confusion was by engaging in it
directly. This decision led to further readings on the subject and trips to Mexico
where I could speak to people who were an integral part of the informal sector in
Cuernavaca. Some of my early discoveries led me to believe that the poor were
not the only ones involved in the informal sector, and that tax evasion was the
cause of people's informality. It became evident at least in the case of
Cuernavaca, Mexico that many people, especially the middle-class as well as the
upper-class participate both in the informal and informal sector . In fact, this
thesis is a compilation of interviews and other firsthand experiences which led
to these findings.
Data Source and Methodology
Without even knowing it, I began the process of collecting data on my
thesis on my first trip to Mexico. The first phase included spending time with
people who were active in the political arena of Cuernavaca. These turned out
to be mainly teachers who either owned or worked for a language institute.
During my spare time I would accompany these people to community meetings
and sometimes political rallies which have increasingly become a way of life in
Cuernavaca. This experiences gave me a good sense of the political and
economic situations that people were aiming to change.
Apart from these activities, I tried to visit as many canteens, open markets,
bars, and small shops so that I could begin to talk to people about their work and
what they thought was important for them. During my meetings I would take
notes on pieces of napkins because I did not want them to become suspicious of
me. I found this technique to be very effective. I collected almost eighty pages of
notes in this way each time I visited Cuernavca.
The latter phase of data collection took place in Cuernavaca in January of
1995. By this time I had worked through a thesis proposal and literature review
on the informal sector and some questions to help me with my fieldwork. My
initial goal was to interview twenty people who represent different types of
informal activities. With the help of some friends I was able to interview twenty
people with different informal perspectives. This way I could begin to
understand the advantages and disadvantages of operating in a particular sector
over another. Also, this would allow me the advantage of interacting with
people whose work and educational experience differed. In the hopes, that this
would help explain why they choose to get involved in the informal sector.
In addition, I got the opportunity to meet with some notable figures on the
informal sector such, as Carlos Salas who teaches at Universidad Autonoma de
Mexico (UNAM). These people not only pointed me to recent studies that have
been conducted on Mexico's urban informal sector but also their own research
which have redirected some of my views on the subject.
Why did I decide on Cuernavaca? One of the primary reasons for
choosing Cuernavaca to do my field work is because I am familiar with the city
and its institutions (i.e., universities, municipal office, grassroots organizations,
etc,). I also chose it because of my relationships with local business men and
women who live in the city. Aside from this, Cuernavaca unlike other Mexican
cities is unique in that it is the only major primate city which lies between
Mexico City and Acapulco. This makes it a major center of attraction for
shopping, dinning, and entertainment. Its location makes it ideal for tourism
even for those that are just driving through to get to Acapulco and elsewhere
further south of the country.
In the last two decades, Cuernavaca's population has increased
dramatically at annual rate of 3.1 percent making it one of the largest secondary
cities in Mexico. This has brought an increase in the birth of informal activities
which are mainly service oriented. Besides this, there are many manufacturing
plants in the area, the largest being the Nissan and Toyota plants which lie in the
periphery of the city. Furthermore, what makes Cuernavaca an interesting place
for this kind of research is that a large number of industries (i.e., service
oriented) in this region continue to operate on an informal basis.
Chapter 1
The "Informal Sector" Debate
In this chapter I present the informal sector debate which emerged in the
1970s and continues in the 1990s. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the
first section I discuss the first study on the informal sector, the work of Keith
Hart and ask what is informal economic activity? The second part covers the
period between 1970s to 1980s. The third part covers the period between 1980s to
1990s. The objective is to examine briefly other scholars' research on the subject
since its emergence in the 1970s.
In the first chapter I present the informal sector debate that began in the
1970's and end with the 1990's. At the outset of this chapter we look at the work
of Keith Hart to help us understand his distniction between formality and
informality. At the same time we examine the question of what is informal
economic activity? The latter part of the chapter is aimed at providing the reader
with different concepts on the subject since its emergence in 1970's.
Part 1: What is Informal Economic Activity?
There many branches of economics focusing on areas such as monetary
economics, welfare economics, micro-economics, etc. Informal economies of
developing countries, however, are perhaps the least studied or understood
phenomena by economists whose works seem to have great influence on the
daily lives of people in the Third World. In this regard, development specialists,
policy-makers, businesses, and financial institutions are recognizing that their
information on international economic development, as well as the well-being
of an enormous number of world's laborers, is severely limited by hidden,
uncounted, and largely unknown economic forces.
As a result, a dramatic increase in attention to the informal sector has
occurred during the past decade. Some recent studies indicate that in some
developing countries the informal sector absorbs up to 70 percent of the urban
labor force (as in Grindle, De Soto, Tokman etc.). Although there is no
consensus in defining it, it is clear that the poor are disproportionately
represented in the informal sector. Therefore, the informal sector is of natural
interest to scholars and policy-makers addressing issues of individual and
societal development.
What, then, is meant by informal economic activity? The term first
emerged in an attempt to explain problems with urban employment in African
countries. To learn more about what was taking place in Africa, the ILO
(International Labour Office) in 1972 commissioned its first study on the urban
informal sector in Kenya. In its search for conceptual categories more
appropriate to the Third World context, the ILO adopted the informal sector
concept to describe work in small-scale activities, largely escaping legal
recognition, enumeration, regulation, or government protection. In Kenya the
ILO found employment in the informal sector--though regarded as stagnant and
unproductive-was competitive, labor intensive, utilized locally produced goods,
and developed its own skills and technology in small family or locally owned
units. Another importance of the ILO Kenya Report was the emphasis that the
informal sector is capable of both creating more jobs and growing faster than the
formal sector and that the "bulk of employment in the informal sector far from
being only marginally productive is economically efficient and profit making"
(ILO Kenya Report, 1972). In sum, the ILO Kenya Report concluded that in
informal sector in less developed countries typically has some or all of following
characteristics:
1. Easy of entry.
2. Use of local resources.
3. Family ownership of enterprise.
4. Small scale operation.
5. Adaptive technology and labor intensive.
6. Skills and training which are not obtained in the formal education system.
7. Unregulated markets and no competition.
A year later, the ILO commissioned Keith Hart (1973) to carry out a second
study of the urban informal sector in Ghana. It was in this study that Hart
introduced the notion of formal and informal wages to aid him with his
research. In this regard, he looked at populations whose income was low and
participated in multiple occupations. Hart's report concluded that the distinction
between formal and informal should be recognized on the basis of wage and
non-wage labor. Secondly, on the basis of self-employment.
Since the first ILO report on Kenya and Keith Hart's work on Ghana, the
the distinction between formal and informal has taken on a new meaning. For
instance, in today's less developed countries, the informal sector is defined as
comprising all activities that fail to meet one or all of following regulatory
standards:
1. Being registered with local authorities.
2. Providing employee benefits.
3. Paying taxes.
4. Complying with sanitation requirements.
5. Providing a minimum wage.
6. Complying with safety standards.
On the other hand, the formal sector encompasses activities which meet
all of following requlatory standards:
1. Registered with local authorities.
2. Provide employee benefits.
3. Pay taxes.
4. Comply with sanitation requirements.
5. Provide a minimum wage.
6. Comply with safety standards.
More recently, the ILO has taken on a different criteria to help it
distinguish between participants who are formal and informal. It considers
those firms which keep accounts as being formal, while those that do not to be
informal. Does this make any sense? This makes little sense, especially given
that a majority of small businesses in developing countries do not have cash
registers or keep regular books. Most transactions are recorded on scrap paper or
kept in the head (interview with Professor Carlos Salas, 1995).
The Informal Sector Debate, Part 2:1970-1983
The literature on the informal sector, and the various debates within it,
have generally failed to provide a discriminating analysis of the informal sector.
Who are the various participants? What are their motives? According to Carlos
Salas (1995), literature has tended to frame the issue with legality-illegality. In
this view, it has tended to equate informality with tax evasion. Present evidence
(Lisa Peattie, 1990) points to a more complicated and varied reality. Moreover,
this literature (perhaps with the exception of a small body of research) has
usually ignored questions of power and wealth asymmetries, and only rarely asks
why there is an informal sector? What sustains it? What makes it grow?
By and large, there have been two dominant themes or issues of
contention in the informal sector debate. First, there is the problem of
definition. No concept has been more elusive and generated more heated
discussion. The second issue of contention is not academic but practical, and
refers to public policy. The essential question is what is the proper role of
government and policy? Related to this last issue is the question of what is the
link between the informal sector and economic development and
macroeconomic strategies aimed at poverty-alleviation.
Rakowski (1994) and others argue that the informal sector debate emerged
from disagreement over how developing countries should develop and at what
pace. This in turn brought into question the role of state planning with respect
to foreign investment, technical assistance and how these factors compared to
the relative importance and costs of addressing social problems such as poverty
alleviation, rural-urban migration, rapid urbanization, and so forth.
In her earlier work, Moser, (1978) an anthropologist and consultant who
was among the first to enter the debate, argues that the early debate resulted from
studies of employment, unemployment, and poverty; that it focused on whether
or not the activities identified as informal sector could generate economic
growth and employment, and under what conditions. She added that progress
in addressing this question led to three major problems: the first is that scholars
began to equate the informal sector with poverty; the second was with
methodology on how to conduct research on the sector; and the third focusing
on the different kinds of linkages between the informal sector and the modern
sector which in turn led to the notion of a dual economy.
Rakowski (1994) introduced the argument that the rise and persistence of
the informal sector were largely due to the failure of development paradigms
that were adopted in the early 50's in developing countries. In essence, the
informal sector has and continues to act as a safety valve during periods of
economic crisis. In this regard the relevant academic and policy questions are:
which informal activities generate economic growth and employment, which
serve as a buffer against unemployment, and what policies promote informal
activities? In her opinion it has been these types of questions which have
contributed to further clarification of the different roles of the informal sector
and encourage debaters to avoid getting bogged down in argument over
semantics and labels. In this regard, Rakowski was one of the first researchers
who began to use the word "informals" (i.e. subcontracted workers,
entrepreneurs, owners of micro-enterprises, the under- and unemployed) as
opposed to sector
Liedholm (1987), an economist, looks at the informal sector debate from
the perspective of policies that were aimed at targeting micro-enterprises. In this
view, he argues that government policies which were meant to promote
investment and increase growth of micro-enterprises resulted in limiting the
informal sector's potential for growth. Liedholm, whose work has focused
primarily on Africa, raises questions often ignored in academic research and
policy discussions in Latin America: what are the impact of the supply and
demand sides of markets on the production of goods and services by micro-
enterprises? Liedholms's answers to the above questions were that the
government should not get involved in the business of protecting local ventures
from foreign competition. To do so will only create obstacles to efficient, small
firms, and will fail to solve the problem of inadequate markets which act as an
important obstacle to economic growth based on micro-enterprise development.
Whereas Liedholm focuses on the impact of state policies on firms, Franks
(1989), an economist and Latin Americanist, focuses on whether or not state
policies will fail to achieve their intended objectives if macro-economic models
continue to exclude informal sector responses to those policies. Frank (1989),
criticizes the generally accepted practice of developing macro-economics model
based only on the "modern" sector when an overwhelming amount of
employment and production seems to concentrate in the informal sector. This is
especially true of Mexico where nearly 63% of its active labor force participates in
the informal sector.4 Thus, both Liedholm and Franks agree that policy makers
need to understand the interaction between the informal sector and macro-
economic policies (even if they are not intended to impact the sector) if they are
to assess and influence the role of the informal sector in development. The
works of Frank and Liedholm gave rise two distinct but very important
arguments. The first argument... informal firms are (a) an opportunity and (b)
problem for crisis economies. If both ideas are to some degree correct, then there
could exist an "optimal" level of informality that could be manipulated through
policy implementation.
Portes (1989), a sociologist and one of the most influential academic voices
in the debate, focuses on the role of the informal sector under crisis conditions
and in transition from import substitution industrialization to export-oriented
industrialization. He brings into the debate the idea that local conditions in
developing countries are a direct result of what gets decided and takes place in
the global market place. Portes raises the question of whether or not labor
standards (i.e. protection and benefits) should be enforced in the economies of
developing countries. The first issue, he says, is that export-oriented firms
require flexibility in employment in order to maximize competitiveness; in the
face of rigid standards, firms and states both tend to "informalize" by only
selectively applying accepted standards. Economic activities can be informalized
passively when state regulation is extended selectively to large firms, but not to
small-scale firms. A prime example is the ability of large firms to sub-contract
with small firms with little or no discretion by the state. In such instances,
workers are exploited to the optimal level. His second argument is that failure to
enforce standards can lead to a downward spiral in wages and work conditions
for workers across the globe. The debate, as Portes sees it, is not whether the state
and firms should enforce labor standards, but what standards are critical and
4 Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios 1992 (ENAM), Mexico City.
non-negotiable, and at what point and under what conditions can standards be
upgraded (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989).
The contention in this literature is that people who make their living by
either selling or buying commodities on an informal basis would be hurt even
more if government is brought in to assist them. The belief is that with
government assistance comes along corruption and inefficient bureaucracy
which would only make matters worse for the poor who are just trying to make
ends meet (Portes, 1989). Extensive government regulation also means that
owners of informal activities can be extremely vulnerable to harassment from
the police and other official members. Why? Because formalizaton requires
businesses to meet certain operation and safety standards, and that government
officials (i.e. health inspectors, police officers) owning this discretionary power
will begin to harass business and owners and ask for bribery (De Soto, 1989;
Portes, 1989).
In sum, Portes provides one of the strongest criticisms against the legalist
approach by pointing out that state regulation presents disadvantages to small
firms and not to large firms. Portes' argument is that small firms manage to
survive by taking and dealing with unfair advantages of state regulations that
apply to large firms. Thus, legality is a burden for small firms and not a privilege.
It is at this point that Tokman's (1992) and Portes' argument intersect. Portes
argues that complete deregulation is the only means to assist small firms. But
Portes' position is somewhat extreme, since in many instances it is the absence of
(or minimal) regulation and enforcement that triggers the chain reaction leading
to informal activity. Tokman, on the other hand, argues that small firms,
depending on what they produce should in fact be regulated, especially if they
pose health and safety threat to the public. But participation in the informal
sector is not limited to regulation-avoidance and tax evasion.
Bromley (1985), a geographer and well-known writer on the informal
sector since the 1970's focuses on the work of Hernando De Soto and the Instituto
Libertad y Democracia. He presents the other side of regulatory policy-labor
standards. He observes that De Soto argued against state intervention and
regulation, but left wages, benefits, prices, supply of inputs, and so on to be
determined by the market. In this sense, he accuses De Soto of being a
conservative, someone who believes that privatization of state owned
enterprises, debureaucraztion, and an unregulated market economy will resolve
the problems of the poor. Bromley's work on the informal sector is important in
that it seeks to outline the implications of the policies promoted by those who
advocate neo-liberal economic policies and state withdrawal from the market
economy.
By 1980, Uzzell (1980), an anthropologist who greatly influenced the early
research of Hernando De Soto, addresses the informal sector by examining issues
of power. For Uzzell, the important issues are whether informality is deviant or
normative and who has power in development planning and regulation. For
example, who benefits? Whose interests are ultimately served? Who pays? He
argues the informal sector presents a rational and normative strategy for most
actors and criticizes formal planning as not "reality based" and acting largely as a
mechanism for maintaining the status quo which in turn contradicts the idea of
progress and change. Momentum for this argument began to increase by 1983 as
Portes (1983) and Sassen-Koob (1983) began to write more precisely on who
benefits from informal activities.
The Informal Sector Debate, Part 3:1984-1993
The informal sector debate evolved significantly between 1980 and 1993.
The argument shifted more toward issues related to worldwide economic and
political restructuring and a world recession. A significant change has been the
shift away from an expanding informal sector as a problem for development, or
an indicator of the failure of development paradigms, to a focus on the informal
sector as an asset or solution to economic crisis and poverty (see for example
Friedman, 1988; De Soto, 1989; and Peattie, 1987). In this view, the debate has
centered mainly on questions regarding the potential of certain informal
activities to generate economic growth and the effectiveness of macro-economic
and poverty alleviation policies and programs. The conceptual shift in the
literature coincided with a policy and analytical shift among the international
financial institutions (e.g., World Bank) who finally came to terms with the fact
that entire segments of the population and work force were excluded from their
neat and elegant models, projects, and development aid -- people whose
activities very much affected macro aggregates. What has become increasingly
popular in Latin America and among bilateral and multilateral donor agencies is
the idea that the informal activities might be a necessary stage or long-term
component of developing market economies. This is consistent with the 1990's
emphasis on promoting democracy, efficiency, privatization, poverty alleviation,
and grassroots initiatives.
There are still debates over definitional concepts and methodology, but the
relative importance and focus have transformed over the years (Olivera
andRoberts 1994; Portes (1989); Sassen (1991); Biggs, Grindle, and Snodgrass, 1988).
For instance, in the 1970's much energy was spent arguing over terminology and
whether the informal sector was a particular sector of an economy or part of a
continuum. However, in the 1980's, research energy shifted to understanding
the phenomenon regardless of what it was called (Peattie, 1987). As a result, by
1993, a number of terms were used virtually interchangeably. These include
informality (operating outside or on the margins of the regulatory framework of
a particular country), informal activity, self-employment, subcontracting, micro-
enterprises, informal sector, the underground or black market, or casual work
(Rakowski, 1994). These came to replace popular terms such as economic
dualism, continuum, petty commodity production, which was more common to
the Marxian school of thought (Portes et al, 1989) , marginality (Peattie, 1987), and
traditional sector have all fallen from favor. As previously mentioned, the
people who engage in informal activities are most frequently called the poor,
unprotected workers, informals, entrepreneurs (i.e., risk takers) and sometimes
referred to as petty producers and casual labor (De Soto, 1989).
In part, the growing popularity of the informal sector concept is a result of
a converging interest in poverty issues and the need for improved policy
instruments. (Tokman 1987; Tendler 1988; Peattie 1987). In Mexico and other
parts of Latin America this popularity was reinforced by economic crisis,
increasing poverty, and scarcity of financial resources and by cultural, political,
and ideological factors such as imported concepts like "underground economy"
and "black market," democracy, and a conservative international policy
environment, (Tokman, 1987).
The work of Marquez (1988), economist and consultant, pulls together
most of the preceding themes by explaining how they became popularized by
organizations such as PREALC (an ILO employment policy body in Latin
America) along with multi-lateral lending institutions. For Marquez, the
arguments of the debate are not that important. What is more important is
making sense of evidence and recommendations and retaining what seems
useful and feasible for macro-economic and social welfare planning.
Similarly, Lisa Peattie (1990) argues that research on the informal sector
should focus attention on the "real world," for grounding policy and action. In
Lisa Peattie's real world, there would be institutions instead of the economy,
entrepreneurs and firms instead of industries and sectors, employers and
workers with particular purposes and characteristics instead of labor and labor
markets. She further argues that economic modeling in regard to the notion of a
dual economy and academic theorizing only contribute to the "fuzziness" of the
informal sector concept (Peattie 1990, pp. 32-34). She was one of the first
commentators to suggest that informality is not limited to peripheral economies,
but is typical of advanced economies as well. It is from this angle that the works
of people like Marquez and Peattie have been able to shift the international
outlook toward the informal sector.
In the middle of the foregoing debate lie a number of scholars who have
written extensively on the contributions that the "informal" sector has made to
the stagnating economies of developing countries (Friedman, 1988; Jenkins, 1988;
Peattie, 1987). In this view, the informal economy is presented as a safety net for
the "formal" economy. In these and other authors' research, the debates have
centered mainly on the productivity of the informal sector, its definition, and the
different ways that government should intervene. Since the early works of
Keith Hart, the most common prescriptions have been credit and technical
assistance. At one point these factors were spoken of as if they were the only
major needs of the informals. Today, however, many researchers have come to
terms with the fact that these are not the only major needs of those who depend
on informal activities to earn their living.
In sum, there is no clear consensus on what to do to improve the
conditions of those whose livelihood depends on informal activities.
Prescriptions seem to vary from country to country. This is largely due to the fact
that the range of activities is so large that it becomes very difficult and often
ineffective to implement undifferentiated policies and programs. Nonetheless,
there is a growing consensus amongst scholars that the poor are not the only
ones who participate in informal sector activities. Another growing consensus is
the need to take a subsector approach in directing the needs of informal sector
participants. Finally, it has becoome dearer that informal sector activities should
not be equated with tax evasion, because there are other reasons why people
engage in informal activities. In this work I explores some of these issues by
asking who are the different actors involved in informal activities? At what
level do they operate? F'r what reasons, and where?
Final Comments
The preceding discussion reveals several important trends. Over the
years, the language of the informal sector debate has become simpler and the
conceptual framework and discussion of theory more coherent and academic.
Proponents of the different approaches seem to share each other's concerns and
critiques. Indeed, the importance of the informal sector as a policy phenomenon
has generated a demand for analysis and policy recommendations framed in
terms easily understood and applied by planners and other policy makers. These
changes have led to more flexible and comprehensive approach for analyzing
complex socio-economic systems and unit of analysis.
Chapter 2
Advantages and Disadvantages of Operating "ilegally"
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a general analysis of the
conditions of legality or illegality that prevail in the informal sector in
Cuernavaca, Mexico. The specific objectives are: (1) to establish reference points
to be used as the bases for determining the degree of "illegality" of the informal
sector; (2) and the advantages and disadvantages of for informal activities
operating illegally, taking into account the present situation of Cuernavaca. In
addition the aim is to provide some plausible explanations as to why those in the
informal sector do not always comply with the many laws and obligations that
are required by their local, state, and national authorities.
The Cost of Being Legal
It has been established by the works of people like Hernando De Soto,
Alejandro Portes and others that in order to operate legally, informal firms have
to comply with a series of legal rules and provisions in the constitutional, fiscal,
and labor regulations whose scope of application is clearly defined. In this view
of legality, informal businesses have to pay different fees for carrying out their
economic activities according to whether production takes place in family units o
semi-enterprises (Tokman, 1987,89).
One common view is that the cost of complying with legal obligations
plays an important role in the decisions of the persons concerned to situate
themselves within the prevailing legality or remain outside. According to De
Soto, it's the number of bureaucratic procedures that.have to be followed by the
owner of a small activity and the time and money that has to be spent that forces
him to remain outside the law. This implies that the person has the possibility
and opportunity to chose one or the other situation after analyzing the "cost-
benefit" ratio and that person has relevant information to justify his final
decision.
Taking into account the above, as well as other order of priority that
enterprises establish regarding the minimum or maximum legal requirements
to comply with, or their decision to evade all or some of them, it is possible to
establish a sequence of degrees of legality-illegality (i.e., continuum scale) based
on importance. For instance in table 2, the lowest value corresponds to a
situation of total legality. The different categories are defined as follows:
generalized illegality means that the enterprise is not registered anywhere and
does not have a license; whereas restricted illegality includes enterprises with
minimum registration and single financial obligation, payable when
commencing operation, or no financial obligation at all (i.e., street vendors);
generalized legality covers enterprises listed in the maximum number of
registers, including the tax and labor registers, that systematically fulfill their
obligation; and restricted legality signifies enterprises that are registered in the
aforementioned registers but do not comply with the obligations that these entail
(Tokman, 1994).
The following describes how I scored my cases on the basis of Tokman's
four terms (i.e., generalized illegality, restricted illegality, restricted legality,
generalized legality). A score of '0' was given to someone if the firm (individual)
had no license and not registered. Conversley, participants holding a vending
permit/license were given a score of '1', and were classified under the category of
restricted illegality. In this order, people who were licensed, registered, and paid
taxes were given a score of '2'. This demonstrates they operating in the restricted
legality category. Finally, participants who were licensed, registered, paid taxes,
and complied with labor regulations were given a score of '3' that means they
were operating in the generalized legality category.
As will be seen below, the importance of this scheme resides in the fact
that, on the basis of the sample chosen, we can make a more systematic and
precise comparison among the different sectors and perceive a pattern of
behavior that is closely linked to legal status. Using the criteria that has just been
outlined, it is possible to analyze the breakdown of these legal-illegal categories
according to different sectors of activity.
Table 1. Breakdown of Enterprises by Degree of Legality and Sector of Activity
Category Commerce Industry Services
Generalized illegality 2 3
Restricted illegality 1 1
Restricted legality - 1 -
Generalized legality 2 2 4
Total 5 3 8
Field Survey 1994, N= 16
Enterprises refers to activities in the commerce, industry and service sector.
Table 2. Number of Enterprises by Degree of Legality
Number of Percentage of Cumulative
Category Value Enterprises Total Enterprises Percentage
Generalized illegality 0 5 33 33.
Restricted illegality 1 2 13 47
Restricted legality 2 1 0 47
Generalized legality 3 8 53 100.0
Field Survey 1994, N= 16
Table 1 reveals that of the enterprises studied, those involved in
commerce activities tend to situate themselves in the generalized illegality and
generalized illegality category with a 50 percent split. This seems to hold true for
those in the service sector as well. The situation is quite different for the
industrial sector, in that firms which fall under this category appear to lean
more toward the restricted legality and generalized legality category. These are
the more legal operations. Many enterprises in the commerce and services sector
seem to operate with the minimum requirements prescribed by the law and
show varying degrees of compliance with regulations.
It can be said that illegality has different levels and cannot necessarily be
restricted to the exclusive fulfillment or non-fulfillment of legal, tax, and labor
regulations. The different cases shown are the result of the characteristics of the
enterprises and its integration in the market, as well as of the regulations and
obligations applicable in each case, together with the state's capacity to control or
tolerate failure to comply with the law when dealing with this type of activity.
Furthermore, this classification scheme allows identification of the economic
areas in which state regulation is either absent or easier to "evade".
In the case of Cuernavaca, it appears that the maximum number of illegal
enterprises are found in the services sector, with three enterprises under
generalized illegality and four under generalized legality. Enterprise which are
totally illegal tend to be located at home. This is due to the fact that in situations
of total illegality, enterprises are obliged to work clandestinely within the
homes; in situations involving contact with customers or selling in public
places, as in the case of commerce and some service sector (i.e., non-home
services), it is necessary to have some form of registration, even though it does
not have to be the most costly (i.e., tax).
On the other hand, it appears that the more legal businesses, whether or
not they fulfill their obligations-are usually located in workshops solely used for
production or selling of goods. In both scenarios, the reasons are different.
Whereas in the first instance it can be assumed that the decision on location is
the result of the candlestine activity, allowing the enterprise to avoid paying rent
and to "evade" tax, in the second case, the enterprise's activity makes it subject to
control because it is carried out on/in premises that are more visible. This
appears to true of enterprises that are located closer to the city center. These tend
to be activities such as restaurant, specialty gift shops, etc. The branch of activity,
legality, and the type of premises are therefore connected in different ways in
situations described.
The information obtained from the Cuernavaca case study indicates that
nearly 40 percent of the enterprises belonging to the service sector tend to operate
under situations of total illegality. The other 60 percent fall under situations of
total legality as I have described above. What are some possible explanations for
such a split? I could give many reasons, but one which seems to stand out more
clearly is that over the years home based activities have increased in Cuernavaca.
A notable driving force seems to be the rise in rent and other fees required to run
a shop. As rent and other fees increase, people begin to move their operation
within the home. This might explain why home based activities have increased
by a rate of 20 percent over the past 3 years ( Diario de Morelos, January 1995, p.
1).
One may question the robustness of my findings as a result of the size of
the research sample. For instance, it can be argued that my analysis is not
statisticaly significant on the grounds that my sample size is too small and non-
random. Thus, there exists little capacity to say what types of activities are more
likely to be formal than informal. This is because I did not have the time and
financial resources to increase my sample size. Had this not been a problem I
think could have produced a firmer conclusion. Research on the informal sector
is never without its problems. Data collection, interviews, and the like are
difficult since few people will discuss their activities and figures are never
reliable. Nonetheless, I think that the methodology I have used here holds a lot
promise for future ways to look at informal sector activities.
Undoubtedly, operating illegally has a number of tangible and intangible
consequences. Not having operating license, not paying taxes, or not fulfilling
registration requirements imposes on those in the informal sector a number of
limitations on carrying their economic activities, which need to be analyzed.
One obvious limitation is the impossibility of access to certain public and
enterprise markets. In the case of Cuernavaca some enterprises are informal not
because of a strategy to avoid being discovered by the authorities, as stated by
some authors, but because of the structural limitations on access to
political/economic resources and the size of the market that they operate in.
An often cited disadvantages of operating outside the law is the difficulty
of obtaining credit. However, this limitation is only an apparent difficulty
because the main obstacle to obtaining credit is the lack of security rather than
the legal situation of the businesses (Tendler, 1993). For example, of all the
participants in my survey only one had obtained credit. The credit was given to
her by an informal credit cooperative that she had to become a member of in
order to qualify. The remainder of the participants started their business with
personal savings, money borrowed from family members or friends, etc. The
evidence generally seems to support the argument that small business owners
whether or not they are formal tend to have weak linkages to formal credit
institutions. This does not necessarily mean that small businesses do not borrow
money from large banks and credit unions.
Another factor that is an obvious disadvantage is the inability for many
informal units to advertise in various ways the products or services they arrange,
sell, or provide, for fear of being discovered by the authorities. This mechanism
is usually an important factor in attracting customers, particularly where the
physical location of the businesses is not favorable and generally far from the
principal markets. This was dearly the case with participants involved in home-
based activities and those who handle indigenous products. The only way that
they could promote their businesses is through satisfied customers ( Gongalves
and Miranda, 1994). In this study, I found that over 90 percent of the people I
interviewed relied on informal channels (i.e., frequent customers) to advertise
their products or services.
Operating a shop is generally thought of as an "easy entry" activity, but in
talking to particiopants it became clear to me the intricacies of price policy,
wholesale buying, social interaction with customers, and general accounting
through memory and mental arithmetic indicate that participating in the
informal sector is no easy way to make living. It is possible for someone to start a
rudimentary activity with neither capital, extensive experience, no credentials.
A women painting seller at a church front told me how she began many years
ago. With five children and a husband who is not able to perform hard work,
she had to earn something. Alberta gets up at about four in the morning, takes
two bus rides to get Cuernavaca so that she can sell her arts and craft. She spends
most of her earnings on traveling back and forth. If something is not sold by the
end of the day, she lowers the price or takes it back home.
I come from everyday from Taxco, which is three-hour bus ride
to Cuernavaca. My friends and I would go to the church yard
everyday to sell our goods. Recently, the head bishop told us he was
receiving complaints from local authorities and surrounding
businesses. They claimed that we were harassing the tourists.
Therefore, we are not allowed to sell our goods in the church yard.
Since then, a police officer was assigned to the church to keep us
away. Yet, we still manage to sell our goods.
This new rule has made it more difficult to for me and my
friend to make enough money to support our families. The church
yard was our central location, but now we have to carry our
merchandise wherever we go. I am lucky because I have two boys
who can help me. Having the boys really helps, because I can stay
behind, while they go home and get more paintings and crafts.
When I stay in the city, I usually sleep in the main plaza. The plaza
is a good place to sleep for many vendors because the trees are big
enough so that no one can see us. At night it really when its cold,
the trees shields us from the wind. It is not really bad.
A less obvious disadvantage of operating illegally is not having long-term
social security in terms of health, unemployment, and pension benefits. In Latin
America, the population with no social security coverage is principally made up
of the informal sector, the unemployed, and the agricultural workers, especially
non-wage workers (Mesa, 1983). In terms of pension benefits this poses a serious
problem to non-wage workers because as they grow to become old they are
expected to provide for themselves. Perhaps this could explain why such large
network of families exist in less developed countries such as Mexico. This also
poses difficulties for women who are the majority in the informal sector. One of
these difficulties is not having access to maternity leave and healthcare for the
child. This means that the husband and other members of the family have to
increase their work hours or resort to a more profitable activity. In the long run,
this also posses a problem for the state because the well being of any nation is
inherently dependent on the well being of its population.
Finally, more than a disadvantage, the payment of bribes that those in the
informal sector have to pay in order not to be harassed by the authorities are
additional costs that in some cases represent fixed sums that have a significant
impact on the structure of regular costs to be paid by those in the informal sector.
For instance, one women I interviewed felt that the reason why her business was
not doing well was because of bribes she had to pay each time officials from the
local ministry of finance visited her (see appendix I, for participants profile).
In every country, there are major obstacles limiting the growth and
profitability of informal activities. One of these is a hostile policy environment.
Typical problems are policies banning street vendors from selling in downtown
locations, and licensing and registration requirements that are extremely time
consuming, complex and expensive from the perspective of small business
owners ( for further readings on this subject see De Soto, "The Other Path",
1989). The current situation in Cuernavaca is such that street vendors are no
longer allowed to use major public places to sell their products or lure potential
customers. It used to be that street vendors could sell their goods in places
tourists come to visit, but this is no longer the case. A prime example of this in
Cuernavaca is the use of fence to keep street vendors from entering restaurants
and churches as well.
In Cuernavaca there is virtually no access to institutional credit for the
informal sector. Banks feel that lending to small businesses is too risky and too
expensive, or are simply not interested. Rigid collateral requirements,
inappropriate payment schedules, extremely high interest rate, and excessive
transaction costs tend to keep these business small and informal.
Lacking access to institutional credit, businesses owners use moneylenders
who charge interest rates ranging from 15 % to 30 % a month to 20% a day, a
major factor limiting the profitability of informal businesses. In Cuernavaca,
the going interest rate on business loans is 33% a month and can change
unexpectedly depending on the economic situation of the country. Whether or
not the interest charged from loan "sharks" reflect their true cost of doing
business is spent to debate, but loans from moneylenders are often to small to
stimulate growth, and payback periods are too short, often a day or week, to
permit long-term investments in equipment or shop improvements. Similarly,
lack of working capital often leaves the business owner little recourse other than
to buy from certain suppliers on credit and at very high prices (Ashe, 1985).
There is also the problem of marketing ones products and services. Even
when the market is stable or expanding, high transportation costs, poor prices
paid by middlemen, and slow payment once goods are delivered are problems.
Also, business owners may lack information on available markets, or many
simply go into the same line of business as a relative or a neighbor without
considering that the market may be saturated. That the informal sector has
continued to prosper and grow in many parts of Mexico and other countries is a
clear indication of the profitability, and resilience e of the enterprises and the
dynamism of the business owners.
On Tax Evasion
We now turn to the claim that tax evasion is one of the primary causes of
informality. Before I present my own views and findings on this matter, I think
it would be a good idea to present the ideas of other researchers who have done
work in this area.
Tax-dodging is like a common cold-prevalent; no certain cure; no
cause for alarm, but often seems to be worse than it really is.
(Houghton, 1979, p. 91)
There is also a feeling, given that people on lower incomes tend to
receive almost all their earnings in salaries and wages taxed at the
source, that tax evasion is the poor man's tax avoidance.
(Furnham and Lewis, 1986,p. 233)
'Fraud is like VD' Campbell once said. 'If you've got it you don't
talk about.' But left to fester, it becomes a cancer: not so much like
VD, but more like the AIDS of the economic system.
(Bose and Gunn, 1989, p. 233)
Best , one of the leading researchers on the subject of tax evasion and labor
regulations wrote that tax and labor regulations are more likely to be influenced
by those connected to the economic and political system of any country, not just
developing countries. His research in many parts of Central and South America
concluded that the influence of "oligarchical" powers in many Latin American
countries ensures that the rich enjoy preferential treatment and are able to
manipulate the tax system in their interest. As a result, those with large incomes
are able to manipulate the tax system in their favor: being born rich, while not a
necessary condition, is usually a sufficient condition to ensure open and
successful tax evasion, concludes (Best, 1976).6
The wealthy have also tended to benefit from the supply of, and demand
for, market niches (i.e. market stalls, etc.). Strategically located market stalls are a
lucrative resources. With the connivance of market officials, there are mainly
6 Best, M.H. (1976) 'Political power and tax revenues in Central America', Journal of Development
Economics. 3. pp. 81-6.
illegal transfers of stalls at inflated prices, and it is the wealthier traders who
have the resources and contacts to accumulate stalls in their own names in the
first place (Eades, 1985). In this connection, studies done by Salas (1995) in Mexico
City demonstrate that it is because of the vertical integration of the markets, the
poorer traders are unable to take direct action against the wholesalers. In all cases
it is the wealthy who are able, through their access to capital, to take over market
niches, helping to provide the political class with an economic base (Salas, 1995).
Similarly, the works of Jerry Jenkins (1988) suggest that if governments of
developing countries wish to improve their tax collection system and raise local
revenue at the sometime they must establish two essential priorities: (1) they
would need to reduce concentrating on those people who do not really have the
means to pay taxes; (2) and focus more on collecting taxes from those people who
demonstrate a substantial amount of income. In this view, government officials
would need to target more rigorously the corporate giants and real estate tycoons.
Basically, the government should stop wasting their time and other resources
trying to collect tax and other fees from people dose to or below the poverty line.
In addition, both authors argue that this is something that governments of
developing countries have consistently managed to ignore. The reason being the
high levels of government involvement in economic activity in many
developing countries, especially in economic services. When mixed with
widespread and complex systems of controls, this allows opportunities for
considerable fraud in terms of under-reporting of an individual or company's
actual earnings (Theobald, 1990). For example,
The amount of taxes one pays depends on two important factors.
First, it depends on who you know at the tax register's office.
Second, it depends on how you categorize your business. In my
situation, I declared my restaurant as a family business, which
means I only have to pay a 2 percent tax rate each year. However,
declaring rmy business as a commercial establishment would
increase my tax rate to 20 percent. Many business owners are not
aware of the loopholes that exist. As a result, some businesses
become vulnerable to bankruptcy. The key to having a successful
business, not only depends on management skills, but it also
depends on who you know, says Carlos, a restaurant owner in
Cuernavaca.
Klitgaard (1987), an authority on corruption attributes widespread
corruption in Mexico partly to the greater importance there of personal
relationships. For instance, if a friend asks for a favor, one might end up doing
it-even if the favor is against government rules. The prevalence in the society of
personalism and amistad , primary loyalties being directed toward one's family
rather than toward government or administrative entity, has an important effect
on the level of corruption. Mexicans treat one another as persons , with the
result that formalized codes of behavior carry little weight in the society
(Klitgaard, 1987, p. 62). By this he means that members of the Mexican political
elite corrupt themselves not only for personal gain but also for their immediate
families and for those who belong to the same kinship that make their clienteles.
In the case of Cuernvaca, this phenomenon is more attached to individuals
belonging to the middle and upper-class. 7 Simply because there the ones who
tend to be more educated in terms of what surrounds them politically and
economically. This is less common amongst indigenous groups who are not
familiar with how the system works.
The tax reform which was introduced two years ago in Mexico
has proven to be very inefficient from my point of view. Before
1993, every business owner paid a flat tax rate. The amount of tax
and other business fees were determined by the location of the
business. For example, the closer the business was to the center of
the city, the more tax it had to pay. Many business owners felt that
this system was unfair. As a result, the local government decided to
reform the tax collection system.
The goal of the reform was to reduce inefficiency and increase
local revenue at the sametime. The strategy is to have officials from
the local ministry of finance visit each registered business to
examine its gross earnings. The income figure is used to determine
the amount of tax that one has to pay. The business owner is fined
for any discrepancies that the official finds in the balance statement.
7 With respect to informal activities, the word lower-class refers to those participants who engage
in informal activities on a full-time basis to meet their basic needs. In other words, the money that
is earned is used primarily to buy food and clothes. The term middle-class refers to those
participants who engage in full-time wage work and on the side carry informal activities for extra-
income which is used to obtain luxury goods, etc. The term upper-class refers to members who engage
in informal activities as distributors of products that are either sold in the streets or storefronts.
These tend to be people who are self-employed in the sense that they are managers of their own
operation or have people working for them.
There are two main problems with this new tax collecting
system. One is that it encourages people to undereport their actual
earnings, which motivates bribery. Second, it prevents business
owners like myself from learning accounting techniques which can
save us money in the long-run. For instance, most business owners
that I know pay private accountants to keep track of their business
transactions. From what I know, many accountants charge more
than what I make in a day or two in my stationery store. Almost
every month I get fined; but hopefully one of these days I can
become better at keeping my own account, says Magdalena.
Legislation has thus provided a good deal of discretionary power for the
agents of the state. Whether or not they exercise it depends on how they see
their own interests. When salaries are low, and inflation rates high, they may
well decide that regular payoffs from traders are preferable over enforcement of
the law. This sporadic enforcement acts in favor of the wealthy, who are able to
afford the bribes to stay in business, and who have most to offer in other -ways to
State officials (Eades, 1985, p. 210). Eades argues that there is a further
complicating factor in the relationship between traders and the State. The
officials of the State are often part-time businessmen themselves, and if they are
not, their wives or close kin almost certainly are. Where officials are not paid
well or their income are falling, such links are vital. For the lower paid formal
sector employee, self-employment offers the only real chance for extra-income:
the role model is not the senior bureaucrat but the self-made cash man, with his
houses, his shops and his vehicles (see for example the work of Peace 8 , 1979),
and such man are accumulating the capital to get out of the formal sector as
quickly as they can.
Thus, the agents of the state are ambivalent towards the legal and
administrative apparatus they are employed to uphold. It serves as a source of
discretionary power, but this is not valued for itself, but for the income it can
generate. This helps explain why much of the legislation relating to both large
and small enterprises fail to be enforced, largely because the agents are either
closely connected to the sector through their responsibilities or relative, or are
actual or potential businessmen themselves. In this respect, given the nature
8 As cited in Klitgaard, Robert E. 1987. Controlling Corruption.
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and class structure of Mexican society, the "informal" sector is largely the
preserve those who are more privileged than others.
Table 3. Cuemavaca: Breakdown in the Number of Taxpayers by Sectors Studied
Number of Percent of Cumulative
Category Taxpayers Total Enterprises Percentage
Commerce 2 13 13
Industry 3 20 33
Services 3 20 53
Total 8 53 100
Field Survey: 1994, N= 16
Table 3 shows that industry and services represent the largest share of
enterprises that pay tax with commerce being the lowest. Almost 50 percent of
the people I interviewed were not registered anywhere, which means they are
not paying taxes. These were people who worked at home or thought that
registering their activity was not necessary. For instance, in situations where the
enterprise does not face strong market competition and does not rely on imports
registration is less likely to take place. This is especially true of indigenous street
vendors whose products not only requires indigenous types of materials but also
special non-formal training. In other words, indigenous people tend to operate
in restricted market. This is not to be taken as saying that these people do not pay
tax. There are other factors which could explain why large numbers of people at
the bottom do not tend to register or pay taxes. For instance, most of the
indigenous people I interviewed'did not know that it is required of them to be
registered with their local authorities. This is because many of them do not
know how to read an write in the formal language.8 An additional explanation
is that compared to their net earnings it would not be worthwhile to register
their activity.
9 Formal education may have little value, but skill acquisitions is necessary for subsectors, such as
small-scale manufacturing, craft work, or maintenance and repair services. Thus, these sectors do
have barriers to entry, one of these barriers may well explain why earning in these subsectors may
be higher than formal wage employment. Also, illiteracy may become a problem for informal
sector enterprise owners if they want to become legal, such as registering ones activity, or to apply
for a bank loan, etc.
As previously mentioned, service enterprises are less likely to escape tax
and other types of regulation because of exposure to the general public. The
same applies to industry where registration is required if trade is expected to take
place. For instance, in Cuernavaca I found that registration and payment of fees
is more common amongst participants involved in the service and industrial
sector which depend on the import market for the bulk of their supply. It is also
in these sectors that people in the middle and upper-class tend to concentrate
because import goods tend to yield higher profit margins in comparison to
products which are produced locally. Though, registration and payment of tax
was higher for these groups, I found that they are more likely than the lower-
class to under-report their income so as to not pay the correct amount of tax.
Final Comments
It has been shown that decisions by owners with regard to the degree of
"legality" or "illegality" is the result of a number of factors such as type of
activity, public exposure, alternative employment, and the possibility of bribing
authorities. It is therefore, not only the excessive and burdensome regulations in
force, as authors like De Soto and Tokman have suggested.
Even where there is some type of registration, the degree of compliance
with legal provisions is also very different. The casuistic explanations is the
result of a number of different factors such as trade links with other formal
enterprises, direct contact with the public or through intermediaries, the level of
macro-economic activity, the owners belief that their activity is temporary or
very unstable or that full-scale legalization would be costly, as well as the relative
ease with which the authorities can be deceived or bribed if one is found out.
Also, the preceding discussion showed that the distinction between "legal"
and "illegal" activities has not been realistic, and it was decided to establish
categories of legality/illegality in accordance with a the hierarchical followed by
the owners themselves in defining the minimum or maximum requirements to
be fulfilled. In this case, five of the fifteen enterprises that had no form of
registration or license and transgressed all the fiscal and labor laws were situated
in the generalized illegality category; the restricted illegality category contained
one enterprise that was least formally registered with the finance authorities or
had a local government authorization but had only a single financial obligation
or paid nothing; the restricted legality category included one enterprise which
had the greatest number of registrations, permits, and the like in the legal, fiscal,
and labor spheres; finally, only eight enterprises comprised the generalized
legality category on the basis of their declaration of strict compliance with all the
regulations, tax obligations, and benefits for their employees.
In the case of Cuernavaca, the results show that industrial enterprises tend
to situate in the restricted and generalized legality categories, whereas
commercial and service enterprise are evenly spread between the generalized
legality and illegality categories. This is because the industrial activities I
observed had links with other enterprises, whereas 50 percent of commerce and
service activities were not obliged to have greater public contact with their
customers are thus less likely to be detected by local authorities. This view is
reinforced when considers that activities which take place in premises that serve
both homes and places for work-as is the case for most service and commerce
shops. In contrast, activities specializing in services to the public are obliged, at
least formally, to comply with regulations in force and thus are found in the
legal categories. It is therefore possible to affirm that the type of activity and the
form of relationships to markets are determinant factors in the tendency to
remain outside the law. However, further research is need in this area before
such claims can be said to be true.
Chapter 3
The "Informal Sector": Who is involved? Where, and for what
reasons?
In this chapter I present evidence which shows that the informal sector
encompasses more than just the poor. Special attention is given to questions
such as: Who is involved in informal activities? How? At what level and for
what reasons? The objective is to explain the motives of the participants. I
think these motives, are inherently dependent on types of political and
economic situation that they face. I intend to demonstrate this by pointing
out the different roles that each class plays in the informal sector. Specifically,
I will focus on the types of products and services that each group provides
which in turn determine their place of business. After doing this, it will
become clear to the reader that some of "Third-World" populations engage in
informal activities in order to survive, while others do it for extra-income.
As I have already mentioned, one of the most persistent assumptions
made about the informal sector by the general public, academics, and policy-
makers is that informality is synonymous with poverty. But not all
informals are poor, nor do all the poor work in the informal sector (Uzzell,
1990). This study found that there are three different classes which make up
the informal sector: those belonging to the lower class, the middle-class, and
the upper-class.9 In what follows, I describe each groups activity.
At the top are the upper-class who act as suppliers to those just below
them, the middle-class. In this view, one has to keep in mind that those
people who sell Marlboro cigarettes, windshield wipers, or Gucci time pieces
in the streets or in their stores but who do not manufacture these items
themselves. Given this, it becomes clear that these people must have some
sort of connections with suppliers who can get them these goods. Based on
field observation, the suppliers tend to be from the upper-class, because they
10 Again, with respect to informal activities, the word middle-class refers to those participants
who engage in full-time wage work and on the side carry informal activities for extra-income. In
this respect, the word upper-class includes those participants who engage in informal activities as
distributors of products that are either sold in the streets or storefronts. These tend to be people
who are self-employed in the sense that they are managers or have people working for them.
are the ones who have connections to import and export channels. This
access is made possible by the political and economic leverage that the upper-
class hold at both the state and national level. They tend to have a lot of what
the average Mexican lacks - the economic and political power to make things
happen when you want them to. In short, its this type of power that allows
the ruling class to control politics and economic outcomes in Mexican
society.
In the case of Mexico, Grindle (1977) states that it is difficult for the poor
to influence the government because Mexican bureaucracy is very pervasive
and powerful. For instance, the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) is known for its co-optive tactics, such as timely distribution of
government jobs and resources, in order to block potential political
opposition from the bottom. This might have some positive effects in the
short-run, but in the long-run such maneuvers by the governments makes it
difficult for resources to trickle down to the poor. At present the most
common tool for co-optaion is the regime's solidarity program which was
initiated by former president Carlos Salinas. The program is based on the
classical notion that public works projects is the avenue to creating jobs for
blue-collar workers, thereby instilling political stabilization. According to
Grindle, it is communities which produce the highest voter turnouts for the
ruling party that seem to benefit from the solidarity program.
In Mexico, history has shown clearly that poor people's demand for
political and economic change often can only come about through
underground movement. A primary example of this is the recent demands
that are being made by the Zapatistas rebel in Chiapas. What Chiapans
natives want is a piece of land to grow food-land that once to belong to them.
In the eyes of an ordinary citizen, the indigenous people of Chiapa are not
asking for too much. However, it is not until one examines the agenda and
motives of the landed elite, who continue to thrive at the expense of those
who live in Chiapas hat we can really begin to understand what is taken place
in Mexico. It is for this reason that I draw from the experiences of people who
live in other regions of Mexico besides Cuernavaca.
A recent article by Paco Ignacio which appeared in the April 1995
edition of The Nation states the following: In Mexico, the struggle for power
within the system has, since the 1940's, followed an unwritten rule: It must
take place underground. This rule has carried more weight than the
country's constitution. He moves on to say that no member of the Mexican
ruling class has any concept of anything-life, the present, the future-outside
what gives them meaning, prestige, wealth, power, a reason for being, a
future, an inheritance, permanence, material goods and even something to
talk about: the system. This is why the PRI, the party of "eternity" (seventy-
five years in power) still governs and despite everything maintains its unity.
What is the reason for all this, one might ask. To theorize and talk
about the growth of the informal sector, we must think about the political
and economic structure that makes up a country such as Mexico. With the
exception of Portes, this is something that has often been ignored in the
informal sector literature. We must look at these forces jointly, otherwise we
begin to paint pictures which are not accurate representations of people's
lives and the activities that they engage in. This is a must for researchers who
are trying to understand in a comprehensive manner the heterogeneity of the
informal sector. Upon doing so it will become dear to many of us that the
well-off are just as involved in performing informal activities as their poor
neighbors. This is why from the start I bring the issue of power and politics
into my analysis.
With regard to the informal sector, Friedman (1988) and others equate
the upper-class of less developed countries to the transnational elites, the
dominant class in the world city. In this view, Friedman argues that the city
is arranged politically and economically to cater to their life styles and
occupational necessities. The upper-class manages to create a cosmopolitan
world which surrounds them. A society which is created by high energy,
rootleseness, and affluence. Members of this class are predominantly males
between the ages of 30 and 50. Because of their importance to the city, they are
a class well served (Friedman, 1988, p. 73). This in part explains the well
defined relationship between the upper-class and the middle-class who act as
distributors for them.
The contrast between the upper-class and the third of the population
who make up the permanent lower class of the world city is very striking
(Friedman, 1992). The lower class, weak in terms of economic and political
stature, are the victims of a system that holds little hope to them. They
crowd along the edges of the primary economy - the 'formal' sector, or settle
in its interval, barely tolerated by the government, yet providing personal
services to the ruling class, doing the dirty work of the city. The ruling class
and its dependent middle sectors enjoy permanent employment, a steady
income, and complete legality; they do not have to justify their existence. For
all practical purposes they are the city. The lower class lives at its sufferance
(Friedman, 1992; Portes, 1989).
In the many works that he has done on the informal sector, Portes
(1991) refers to this type of relationship as "internal colonization". A process
whereby the labor and resources of the lower class gets exploited by the upper-
class who run the country. From this perspective, Portes goes on to argue that
the periods of imperial rule and degradation still remain with us today,
especially in the former colonies that exist throughout Latin America. By this
he means that things have not changed since the colonial periods of Latin
America and the rest of the World. Portes also argues that the emergence of
new and improved technology, which is derived from the international
community (or the periphery), has led to an increase and sustainability of this
divide.
In this connection, members of the middle-class and those slightly
below, act as vendors of goods and services that they obtain from the upper-
class. What makes this type of relationship work is that middle-class people
are familiar with the different products that the upper-class bring into the
country. People at the top know that the middle-class are the ones with the
money to invest in their products. Another important factor is management
skills in terms of knowing how to handle money and keep records which is
more prominent in the middle-class.
The middle-class resembles members of the upper-class in that they are
more connected to the political and economic networks of the urban centers
than members of the lower-class. They know where to buy their supplies,
and most importantly they know how to negotiate terms of agreement (i.e.,
exchange rate, monthly payments, etc.) with their suppliers. There the ones
who are more concerned with how to obtain a license or permits for their
activity. Simply because they would not want to jeopardize their privileges.
The tendency amongst the middle-class is to engage in informal activities on
a part-time basis while they hold on to full-time wage work; often in a
government office or private firm. Most of them consider the work that they
do on the side as a way to earn extra money. Let us look at an example of
someone who works full-time as a teacher and sells imports on a part-time
basis.
I learned about this business through my grandmother, who
owned a boutique store located in a section of a fayuca (flea
market) for nearly 40 years. I started working at the store when I
was nine years old. Back then, the fayuca was much smaller in
size and there was not much variety in terms of products.
Today, however, the cooperative house has close to 200 shops.
You can purchase almost anything at this market, but once you
buy something you cannot return it. Therefore, there are risks
involved when you buying goods in the fayuca. This is
especially true with electronic products because most of them are
rebuilt. There are goods which are less risky, such as shoes and
clothes. Yet, what holds true for all items is that every sale is
final.
If you decide to sell merchandise that is produced outside of
the country, you have to be connected to a person who is
dependable and can provide reasonable prices. For someone
who is just starting a business, this requires money and network.
Having capital helps, but the most important element to this
relationship is trust. My situation is unique because I tapped
into a network that my grandmother had already established in
Mexico City.
In this type of business you cannot afford the risk of not
complying with regulations. It is clear to local authorities that I
am making a substantial amount of money because imports
usually yield a higher profit. Also, in this type of setting your
business is exposed to government officials. They come around
once a month to inspect vendors. If anything seems suspicious,
then your asked to show receipts for the previous months tax
and utility payments. Most people steal electricity and
sometimes even water, but I choose not to so this because I do
not want to get expelled from the cooperative, says Francsico.
As we can see, having the proper connection in terms of suppliers is a
key component. This story illustrates the linkages between the middle and
upper-class and how it takes time to build and secure such a relationship. The
most important aspect of this story, though, is that it contradicts the
commonly held perceptions that informal activities have no barriers to entry.
As Francisco points out, there are tremendous barriers to becoming a seller of
imported goods. It requires more than enough capital to engage in these types
of activities.
As I have already mentioned, the middle-class are more aware of what
takes place in the market that they operate. In terms of products they know
where to invest their money and where not to. The tendency is to invest on
imported goods because they usually have a higher rate of return value
compared to domestic products. I also found that most people who do it for
extra-income tend to be involved in different activities. For instance, the
selling of clothes is usually complemented with cosmetic products and
jewelry. The middle-class women who provides cheap meals in her home
usually sells beers, cigarettes, matches, kerosene, and other products. One
place I went to almost every night provided products such as toothpaste,
razors, deodorant, etc. Again, most of these products are not produced locally.
In what follows, I give an example of someone who was fortunate enough to
join the ranks of the middle-class.
I knew that my parents could not afford to send me to college.
Yes, education is free of charge in Mexico, but that is only half of the
story. Classes may be free, but how do you get there? In my
situation, the closest university was 30 miles from where I lived,
and the only way I could get there was by bus. Besides getting to
school, there are other things that one needs to consider. For
example, you need clothes , paper to write on, and not to mention
food since your going to spend so much time away from home. So I
realized that if I was going to attend college, I would have to figure
out a way to pay for these things.
Two years before going to college Yolanda began selling cosmetics from an
Avon catalogue. This was her avenue to an institution of higher education.
After two years of working at home selling cosmetics and jewelry, Yolanda
earned enough money to attend college. When she left college with a degree in
Mechanical Engineering, Yolanda went to work for a bio-chemical plant located
10 miles outside Cuernavaca. She worked there for 10 years. When asked why
she left the company, she said, that were many reasons:
I was well under paid for my responsibilities and knew that a
chance for promotion was dose to never. I went to school thinking
that my profession would be valued but so far this has not been
true. It turned out that I was working more hours and earning less
compared to my friends who never went to college. This really
made me angry.
Yolanda is now a full-time Spanish instructor who sells Avon products
and clothes at home.
Most of my income comes from these activities, says Yolanda.
Selling clothes and cosmetics is not an easy task. I spend at least 12
hours a day going from house to another to take customer order
and to collect payments. Recently I hired my brother who goes to
Mexico City to purchase merchandise for me. I have a very stable
business and this is due to the way I treat my customers. I find that
giving people credit is a good thing because it encourages them to
buy more from me. Moreover, it reinforces trust between me and
some of my clients. Yes, there are risks with giving credit. When
some of my clients can not pay me I tell them to give me whatever
they can for that week. Going into business for myself is by far the
best decision I have made since graduating from college. As a
result, I much more independent in that I have been able to build a
home, purchase an automobile and take a vacation once a year.
These are some of the things I hoped for in my old job.
On the other hand one ends up with the lower-class whose reasons for
engaging in informal actives are purely for survival. In other words, they do
it to meet their basic needs. When translated this means getting two meals a
day and, if they happen to be lucky, a decent home to live in. In the case of
Cuernavaca, the people who depend on informal activities in order to
survive operate at a different level. That is they are less dependent and less
connected to the mainstream markets which are made up of the middle and
upper-class. This is demonstrated clearly by their products and where they
carry out their activities. They do business not in the core of the city, but in
the outer periphery of those who are registered and own market stalls. Their
products tend to be indigenous and reflect labor-intensive techniques.
Remember, the middle-class trade goods which are less labor-intensive. This
is because most of their products are mass produced, therefore requiring
manufacturing and assembly of parts. Thus, in the periphery of urban centers
such as the city of Cuernavaca you tend to find indigenous people whose
products are quite different from the middle-class who locate in the center of
the city. Another distinguishing factor is that people who engage in survival
activities tend to have the following characteristics about them:
1. They have no savings account.
2. Their children usually do not attend school, because they have to help out.
3. Thus a strong presence of child labor exists within this group.
4. They often live in huts constructed with scrap metals and sometimes
plywood.
5. They have no access to running water, electricity, and if they do, its because
they tap into them illegally.
6. Their mode of planning tends to be short-term not long term.
7. Because of these characteristics they tend to locate themselves in the outer
fringes of the city.
These are people who live at the bottom. They are not concerned with
market interest rates or when the next shipment of tennis shoes is due to
arrive in Mexico City. Nor do they tend to worry about what they are going to
do for their daughters sixteenth birthday which happens to be a great concern
to the middle and upper-class.
Many, though not all, of the lower class are of different ethnic origins
than the ruling class; often they have a different skin color as well, or speak a
language or dialect of their own. This was especially true of members of the
lower class that I interviewed in Cuernavaca, Mexico. The majority of them
tend to be indigenous people who speak a different language other than
Spanish. Unlike their counterparts, these people have never received any
formal or educational training from the system that is suppose to look after
them.
My sense is that those who operate at the bottom go to sleep hoping
that tomorrow they can increase their food supply. Often, children do not go
to school because they have to get up early in the morning in order to sale
their share of indigenous paintings, pottery, and hand made jewelry. In
Cuernavaca and other parts of Mexico schools are made available to
indigenous populations, but the problem is that many of them have no access
to transportation. Furthermore, going to school requires a child to have a
notebook, something to write with, clothing, and not to mention food. These
things cost money-money that many indigenous family have to use for food.
Sending a child to school would decrease the family's income by a substantial
amount. A child can earn 10 to 20 pesos ($2 to $4 US dolalrs) per day selling
chewing gum and handmade crafts. All of this becomes clear when one
walks into a bus terminal at six in the morning and is approached by child
selling homemade cookies, etc. Here is what one boy had to say an interview:
The way I make my money is by helping people put their
trash in the dumpster. My best days are Wednesdays because
that is when the trucks come to pick up the trash. I sit near the
dumpster and help each person throw their garbage away. I
usually earn 10 to 15 pesos a day ($2 to $3 US dollars). This is
good money in comparison to what many people earn in the
factory.
At first the odor of the garbage was terrible, but after a while
you get used to it. When the smell gets really bad, I just move
away from the dumpster. This usually happens in the afternoon
when it gets hot and humid. The smell sometimes gets to the
point where I can no longer withstand it. This is when I go
home for two or three hours then return.
There are many people who do this for a living. I know of at
least four friends who do exactly this type of work. I started by
helping my friend out. Later he moved to Acapulco, so I took
over his dumpster. The dumpster belongs to me and this is clear
among the other boys in the neighborhood. It is rare that a
person gives up their dumpster, but when they do, they sell the
dumpster for at least 200 to 500 pesos ($40 to $100 US dollars),
says Felipe.
Unlike the children of middle and upper-class families, Felipe cannot
afford the luxury of going to school or stay home to watch television like
most children his age. As we can see, there can be very different reasons for
working informally. Some people work informally to supplement income
and others do it to meet their basic needs. In this view, the causes of
informality are quite different from the commonly held perceptions that taxes
is the reason why many people choose to go informal. Also, the preceding
example makes it clear to us that for some people there is no choice involved
in what they must do for a living in order to survive.
In terms of income, money that is earned by the middle and upper-
class are used to purchase goods and services which exceed basic necessities.
The extra income that they earn by performing informal activities is used
primarily on luxury goods such as automobiles, furniture, vacations, and
often to send their children to music and language schools. Personal savings
is more common amongst these groups, for example. Conversely, the lower-
class which is largely made up of indigenous people spend their income
mainly on basic needs. Apart from this, most of their money is used to
transport their goods from and to the urban centers so that they can sell them.
Whatever they have left is used to buy corn tortillas, nopales, and other
native food inputs.
Thus, traveling time and transportation cost appear to be greater for
those operating at the bottom than for those at the middle and top of the
scale. This supports further the hypothesis that some groups, especially the
poor, participate in the informal sector solely for survival purposes. Though
I have no real numbers to show this, firsthand experience with these people
strongly support this hypothesis. In addition, I think the following example
supports my argument.
I come everyday from Taxco, which is a three-hour bus ride
to Cuernavaca. My friends and I would go to the church yard
everyday to sell our goods. Recently, the head bishop told us he
was receiving complaints from local authorities and
surrounding businesses. They claimed that we were harassing
the tourists. Therefore, we are not allowed to sell our goods in
the church yard. Since then, a police officer was assigned to the
church to keep us away. Yet, we still manage to sell our goods.
This new rule has made it more difficult for me and my
friends to make enough morney to support our families. The
church yard was our central location, but now we have to carry
our merchandise wherever we go. I am lucky because I have
two boys who can help me. Having the boys really helps,
because I can stay behind, while they go home and get more
paintings, etc. When I stay in the city, I usually sleep in the
main plaza. The plaza is a good place to sleep for many vendors
because the trees are big enough so that no one can see us. At
night when its cold, the trees shields us from the wind. It's not
really bad, says Alberta, an indigenous women in her late
forties.
Alberta's situation represents a case where someone spends a majority
of her time traveling back and forth in order to reach their customers. It also
demonstrates the persistence and boldness that are required by those that are
just trying to survive. The struggle that people like Alberta have to go
through is instructive for those scholars who think that the majority of
"Third-World" populations choose to participate in informal activities in
order to avoid being taxed. Unfortunately, it is people like Alberta who are
not allowed to sell in the middle of the city because they cannot afford the cost
of high rent, permits, and other required municipal fees, and not to mention
bribes. When asked why she is not registered with local authorities Alberta
said that for her it did not make any sense to do so because she does not make
enough money.
Final Comments
As we have seen, there is no single cause when it comes to explaining
people's informality. In reality there are many causes. In order of
importance, lack of a sufficient wage- a wage which covers the basic needs of
any given family is what should be considered as being the main catalysts.
When asked what led to their involvement in informal activities, many of
the respondents felt that the problem was not so much a lack of employment
per se, but rather the lack of a minimum wage that is sufficient to support a
family.
Very few chose to work in the formal sector because of this reason. For
instance, a child who sells chicle in the streets makes more money than most
wage laborers. Sometimes ten time as much as the average laborer. In this
sense, there is very little prospect in searching for regular wage work. One
major implication behind this is that young adults begin to drop out of
school, because in many respects the returns to education is very low. At least
in the short-run. The end result is that people begin to see no future
guarantees in becoming an engineer or an accountant, especially in the long-
run where personal contacts takes precedence over ones' educational
attainment.
The truth is that Mexico's political and economic structure seems to
work for those people who have the means to shape it and make it work for
themselves. This means having money, which in turn connects you to
people in the government. The average citizen who only earns about 11 to 13
pesos per day does not posses this leverage. As one subject puts it, our way of
doing things is illegal because we have no means to influence those in the
political and economic sphere of this country.
As John Friedmam (1992) notes, in the political climate existing in the
"Third-World" today, all attempts to take from the rich and give to the poor
are bound to fail. Only policies that place growth incentives where the poor
are capable of producing true and effective results. Until this is recognized by
governments of "Third-World" countries and the international community,
the chance for progress remains gloomy.
Finally, by example I have shown that the poor are not the only ones
who depend on informal activities for income. I have also demonstrated that
it is best to refer to informal activities as income-seeking strategies. The
importance of this resides in the fact that it draws both the middle and upper-
class into the discussion. This approach is very useful in understanding the
reasons and motives of the different participants. As we have seen in the
preceding discussions, the poor person's motives and reasons for participating
should be equated with survival strategies. As for the middle and upper-
class, we can say that they do it for extra-income. Once again, my findings and
analysis are only applicable to Cuernavaca, Mexico. And as such, we cannot
make any cross-country generalization.
Summary
In the first chapter I presented a multi-dimensional and complex
informal sector debate. The debate addressed (1) definitional and conceptual
issues from the perspective of many researchers, (2) methodological issues, (3)
questions regarding the nature and linkages between informal and so-called
modern activities and the informal sector and the state, and (4) the role of
informal activities in development and democratization.
Generally speaking, the informal sector is not confounded by people
whose activities are total illegality. In other words, the degree of compliance
is directly related to ones economic, political, and personal circumstances.
Those with the necessary means to tend to be more legal than others.
In the second chapter we looked at issues related to operating illegally.
The objective of this section was to examine the advantages and
disadvantages of operating outside the legal framework. The general analysis
was based on conditions of legality and illegality that prevail in the informal
sector in Cuernavaca, Mexico. In this connection, the specific objective was to
establish reference points top be used as the bases for determining the degree
of "legality-illegality" of the informal sector, taking into account the present
situation of Cuernavaca. Following this analysis, the chapter provided some
plausible explanations as to why those who operate in the informal sector do
not always comply with the many regulations and obligations that are
required by their local, state, and national authorities.
In this respect, some of the major findings were that people who do it
for survival tend to operate in situations of total illegality because their
activities tend to be less stable and less profitable in comparison to the
activities of the middle and upper-class members. However, when we look at
the types of activities that the middle and upper-class engage in the degree of
legality appears to increase. This is because the middle and upper-classes tend
to participate in commerce and service activities which are not easily hidden.
Furthermore, it makes a lot of sense for members of the middle and upper-
class to comply with regulations, especially given that they are the ones who
dominate import and export channels.
We also looked at the issue of tax evasion, and asked the question of if
tax evasion is the primary cause of informality. My findings indicate that for
the poor, tax evasion does not explain why they place themselves under
extreme conditions in order to make ends meet. If anything, tax evasion
appears to be more important for the middle and upper-class whose informal
activities seem to be more lucrative and rewarding. If we want to equate tax
evasion with illegality we must then look at those groups who can actually
afford to pay it.
In the third and final chapter I argued that the informal sector is made
up of three distinct groups of people. By way of examples I demonstrated that
poor people do it in order to survive. Whereas the middle and upper-class
participate for reasons which exceeds their basic needs. As I have described,
the nature and scope of their activities tend to be quite different compared to
indigenous groups who handle labor intensive products.
We also looked at the power relation between these three different
groups. My analysis showed that members of the middle and upper class are
better connected to political and economic resources in the region of
Cuernavaca than the poor. As Portes puts it, the poor are well disposed. In
other words, the poor are placed in situations where there are more occupied
with self-preservation (i.e., survival) than with other matters such as politics
and economics of the country.
Power is one of the most commonly neglected variables in studies on
labor markets and enterprises (Uzzell, 1980; Liedholm, 1990; Bromley, 1994).
Who benefits and who loses through the specific regulations, policies, and
programs; and what are the vested interests that make difficult reform and
change? What economic conditions facilitate incorporating the poor and
powerless into political processes? How do firm behavior and employment
patterns interact with, support, or threaten the authority of the state?
Analyses need to be sensitive to ideological positions and ethical issues
(Rakowski, 1994, p. 278).
More research is needed on the different activities that represent the
so-called informal sector. We need to shift away from a wholistic approach to
a subsector approach. There is a great need to understand individual
activities separately. A blanket policy approach should be avoided (Marquez,
1988) and the relative short and long-term benefits of direct and indirect
policies should be assessed for each policy problem. As stated earlier, policies
and programs need to be more heterogeneous and flexible, because informal
sector activities tend to change over time, especially in times of economic
expansion and economic recession (Franks, 1989; Cartaya, 1990; de Olivera and
Roberts, 1994).
Policy recommendations should be grounded in knowledge of the nature
of planning, the production of information or knowledge, state objectives, needs
assessments, and the impact of specific policies on the balance of power and the
authority of the state. Policies too often promote the interests and values of
some groups at the expense of others and are based on outdated information
produced by methods and models that include implicit ideological biases.
Therefore, policy makers should solicit input from "target" groups, not merely
from "experts," as a means to improving the potential of policies to address real
problems and as a mechanism for democratizing the policy process. Finally,
policy makers should acknowledge and correct for biases that are unacceptable
morally, for example, that reinforce inequality and exacerbate social problems
like poverty (Uzzell, 1990).
Sample of Survey Questions
Name: Alberta
Age: 44
*Education: Never attended school
Current Occupation: Street Vendor
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who started this activity?
1. [ ] You.
2. [x] You and someone else.
3. [ ] One of your family members.
4. [ Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [ ] Independence.
2. [x] Family tradition.
3. [ ] Extra-Income.
4. [ ] Could not find wage work.
5. [x1 To meet basic needs.
Are you registered?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [ ] Big commercial businesses.
2. [ ] Small commercial businesses.
3. [ Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1.[ Bank loan.
2. [ ]Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [ ] Informal credit.
5. [x] Other.
Profile
Alberta wakes up at four in the morning everyday and goes to church, not to
pray, but to sell traditional paintings so that she can support her family. When I
first approached her, she was hesitant to speak to me out of fear that I was a
government official. It was difficult to convince her to speak to me not only
because she mistrusted me, but also because a bus had arrived with tourists-her
main customers. After ten minutes of persuasion, I gained her trust. Finally,
she agreed to talk to me behind an alley across the main entrance of the church.
I come everyday from Taxco, which is a three-hour bus ride to
Cuernavaca. My friends and I would go to the church yard everyday
to sell our goods. Recently, the head bishop told us he was
receiving complaints from local authorities and surrounding
Education refers to the last grade the person attended or completed in a formal education system.
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businesses. They claimed that we were harassing the tourists.
Therefore, we are not allowed to sell our goods in the church yard.
Since then, a police officer was assigned to the church to keep us
away. Yet, we still manage to sell our goods.
This new rule has made it more difficult for me and my friends
to make enough money to support our families. The church yard
was our central location, but now we have to carry our merchandise
wherever we go. I am lucky because I have two boys who can help
me. Having the boys really helps, because I can stay behind, while
they go home and get more paintings, etc. When I stay in the city, I
usually sleep in the main plaza. The plaza is a good place to sleep
for many vendors because the trees are big enough so that no one
can see us. At night when its cold, the trees shields us from the
wind. It's not really bad.
Sample of Survey Questions
Name: Magdalena Are you registered?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Education: College graduate
Current Occupation: Stationary Store Owner
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who started this activity?
1. [x] You.
2. [ I You and someone else.
3. [ ] One of your family members.
4. [1 Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [ I Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [1 Could not find wage work.
5. [1 To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [ ] Big commercial businesses.
2. [x] Small commercial businesses.
3. [ I Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [ ] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ I Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [ ] Informal credit.
5. [1 Other.
Profile
The tax reform which was introduced two years ago in Mexico
has proven to be very inefficient from my point of view. Before
1993, every business owner paid a flat tax rate. The amount of tax
and other business fees were determined by the location of the
business. For example, the closer the business was to the center of
the city, the more tax it had to pay. Many business owners felt that
this system was unfair. As a result, the local government decided to
reform the tax collection system.
The goal of the reform was to reduce inefficiency and increase
local revenue at the same time . The strategy is to have officials
from the local ministry of finance visit each registered business to
examine its gross earnings. The income figure is used to determine
the amount of tax that one has to pay . The business owner is fined
for any discrepancies that the officials find in the balance statement.
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Age: 39
There are two main problems with this new tax collecting
system. One is that it encourages people to under report their actual
earnings, which motivates bribery. Second, it prevents business
owners like me from learning accounting techniques which can
save us money in the long run. For instance, most business owners
that I know pay private accountants to keep track of their business
transactions. From what I know, many accountants charge more
than what I make in a day or two in my stationary store. Almost
every month I get fined; but hopefully one of these days I can
become better at keeping my own account.




1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Education: College graduate
Current Occupation: Sells clothes/cosmetics
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x Yes.








You and someone else.
One of your family members.
Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [ ] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [ Could not find wage work.
5. [ To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [x] Big commercial businesses.
2. [ 1 Small commercial businesses.
3. [x] Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [ 1 Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ I Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [1 Informal credit.
5. [ ] Other.
Profile
I knew that my parents could not afford to send me to college.
Yes, education is free of charge in Mexico, but that is only half of the
story. Classes may be free, but how do you get there? In my
situation, the closest university was 30 miles from where I lived,
and the only way I could get there was by bus. Besides getting to
school, there are other things that one needs to consider. For
example, you need clothes , paper to write on, and not to mention
food since your going to spend so much time away from home. So I
realized that if I was going to attend college, I would have to figure
out a way to pay for these things.
Two years before going to college Yolanda began selling cosmetics from an
Avon catalogue. This was her avenue to an institution of higher education.
After two years of working at home selling cosmetics and jewelry, Yolanda
earned enough money to attend college. When she left college with a degree in
Mechanical Engineering, Yolanda went to work for a bio-chemical plant located
10 miles outside Cuernavaca. She worked there for 10 years. When asked why
she left the company, she said, that were many reasons:
I was well under paid for my responsibilities and knew that a
chance for promotion was close to never. I went to school thinking
that my profession would be valued but so far this has not been
true. It turned out that I was working more hours and earning less
compared to my friends who never went to college. This really
made me angry.
Yolanda is now a full-time Spanish instructor who sells Avon products and
clothes at home.
Most of my income comes from these activities, says Yolanda.
Selling clothes and cosmetics is not an easy task. I spend at least 12
hours a day going from house to another to take customer order
and to collect payments. Recently I hired my brother who goes to
Mexico City to purchase merchandise for me. I have a very stable
business and this is due to the way I treat my customers. I find that
giving people credit is a good thing because it encourages them to
buy more from me. Moreover, it reinforces trust between me and
some of my clients. Yes, there are risks with giving credit. When
some of my clients can not pay me I tell them to give me whatever
they can for that week.
Going into business for myself is by far the best decision I have
made since graduating from college. As a result, I much more
independent in that I have been able to build a home, purchase an
automobile and take a vacation once a year. These are some of the
things I hoped for in my old job.




1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Education: College graduate
Current Occupation: Jewelry Repair/Vendor
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.








You and someone else.
One of your family members.
Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [ ] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [ Could not find wage work.
5. [ ] To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [ 1 Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [ ] Big commercial businesses.
2. [1 Small commercial businesses.
3. [1 Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ Bank loan.
2. [ ] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [x] Informal credit.
5. [ ] Other.
Profile
Rocario currently holds two jobs. She works as a full-time Spanish instructor
with Universal, a language center in Cuernavaca, Mexico. This job pays her
about a quarter of what she earns as a part-time jewelry dealer in her home. I
asked her how she got involved in this type of business.
In Cuernavca, there are not many shops that can repair watches
and other types of jewelry so I decided to open one, said Rocario. I
got the money by joining a revolving loan credit union where you
can borrow up to five times the amount you put into it. In essence,
it is a cooperative made of people who know each other and who
are interested in opening their own business. In my case, becoming
a member of the credit union was a smart move because it
provided at a much lower interest rate compared to local banks.
For instance, before I discovered credit union, I had approached
at least three banks for a loan. I was denied credit from all of them
because I had no collateral, or someone who could co-sign for me.
Furthermore, the banks were charging anywhere between 27 to 34
percent interest on their loans. This was incredibly high compared
to what I am paying now, which is 3 percent. This is why I think
the credit union is a good idea.
My business is doing well, but it could be doing much better if I
was not so young. What I have realized is that most people are
afraid to come to me because they think I have no experience. They
attribute this to my age. This is because most people involved in
this type business tend to be in their late 30's and 40's. This affects
me some, but usually I say to my customers I can repair anything
even if I cannot. If I can not repair a particular item what I do is
take it to a shop that can. In this business what matters the most is
quality and the way I provide it is by doing a good job in a
reasonable amount of time.
Later in our discussion I asked Rocario why she chooses to work a second job
and what it has done for her personally. She gave me a smile and said that its
not uncommon for individuals, even professionals like herself to work two jobs.
If you want to live in a decent home and eat regularly you have
to hold at least two jobs. The way things are going in Mexico its
almost impossible to survive with one job unless that job pays you
well.





2. [ ] No.
Education: College graduate
Current Occupation: Jewlery smith
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ I No.
Who started this activity?
1. [x] You.
2. [ ] You and someone else.
3. [1 One of your family members.
4. [1 Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [ ] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [1 Could not find wage work.
5. [1 To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [1 Big commercial businesses.
2. [1 Small commercial businesses.
3. [ ] Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ I Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. 1 Informal credit.
5. 1] Other.
Profile
In Mexico, its difficult to make a decent wage by working for
someone else. It took a long time before I realized this in my job
with Baxter pharmaceutical. For example, in the 15 years that I
worked for this company I only received two raises. As was with
every other year, it became increasingly difficult to support my
family with the salary I was earning. There were several times
when I had to seek .financial support from my father in order to
make ends meet. This was quite embarrassing for me , but at the
time I had no other alternative. One day I went to work and told
my boss that I was leaving the company. He asked me why? I told
him I had found another job even though there was no other job.
That is when I made the decision to go into business for myself.
When I first opened my business, I was scared because it had
been a long time since I worked with gold and silver. However, it
did not take long to recall some of the skills I had learned as an
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apprentice. To minimize my risk I began by producing graduation
rings for students who could not afford them through their schools.
They would usually come to me with a friends' ring and ask me to
replicate one for them. I started with 13 students. At present I serve
close to 150 students who all reside in Cuernavaca. I also have
clients from Mexico City.
The advantage of being in this business is that I have my own
designs. I am always trying to combine different styles in order to
create something new and exciting. Once this happens and a
particular customer discovers a certain product the phone does not
stop ringing. Another competitive advantage is my ability to work
with different types of stones . The point is that you have to be
creative. Otherwise, you will not survive.




1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Education: Completed elementary school
Current Occupation: Garbage handler
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who started this activity?
1.[ ]You.
2. [You and someone else.
3.11 One of your family members.
4. [x] Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting




4. [ Could not find wage work.
5. [x] To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [ ] Yes.
2. [x] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1.[] Big commercial businesses.
2.[1 Small commercial businesses.
3.11 Big factories.
4. [ Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Other.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. ] Bank loan.
2. [ 1 Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3.11 Personal savings.
4. [] Informal credit.
5. [x] Other.
Profile
The way I make my money is by helping people put their trash
in the dumpster. My best days are Wednesdays because that is when
the trucks come to pick up the trash. I sit near the dumpster and
help each person throw their garbage away. I usually earn 10 to 15
pesos a day ($2 to $3 US dollars). This is good money in comparison
to what many people earn in the factory.
At first the odor of the garbage was terrible, but after a while you
get used to it. When the smell gets really bad, I just move away
from the dumpster. This usually happens in the afternoon when it
gets hot and humid. The smell sometimes gets to the point where I
can no longer withstand it. This is when I go home for two to three
hours then return.
There are many people who do this for a living. I know at least
four friends who do exactly this type of work. I started by helping
my friend out. Later, he moved to Acapulco, so I took over his
dumpster. The dumpster belongs to me and this is clear among the
other boys in the neighborhood. It is rare that a person gives up
their dumpster, but when they do, they sells the dumpster for at
least 200 to 500 pesos ($40 to $100 US dollars).
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2. [ ] No.
Education: One year of elementary school
Current Occupation: Taxi Driver
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who started this activity?
1. [ ] You.
2. [x] You and someone else.
3. [ One of your family members.
4. [ Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x Independence.
2. [ 1 Family tradition.
3. [x) Extra-Income.
4. 1 Could not find wage work.
5. [1 To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ I No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [1 Big commercial businesses.
2. 1 Small commercial businesses.
3. 1] Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ ] Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. 1] Informal credit.
5. [1 Other.
Profile
I left school in the sixth grade to support my mother, who had
became completely blind, and my two younger sisters. My first job
was shoe shinning because it did not require a lot of money to set
up. With this job, I could move from one place to another without
difficulty. This was an ideal.job for me at the time. I became very
good at it. In fact, I was one of the few boys who were allowed to
work at hotel lobbies and restaurants. Later, I decided to quit shoe
shining in order to become a taxi driver. As a taxi driver I would
have a higher income and be able to build a home for my family.
In my situation, I rent a taxi because I cannot afford to buy a
vehicle. Moreover, to own a taxi you would need a medallion
which is expensive and difficult to acquire. The medallion allows
you the power to make whomever you want a taxi driver. For
example, the men I rent from has at least ten person working for
him. He does not have to provide them with vehicles. All he has
to do is sign his name on their release form. The person takes the
form to the registry and gets a release form which declares him a
taxi driver. That's the easy way to become a taxi driver.
When you rent a taxi, the owner of the taxi is responsible for
registering and paying for your social security benefits. Often this
does not happen because it is too expensive. Furthermore, it is a
hassle to deal with officials at the Social Security Office. If you want
your benefits, there are two ways of getting them. One, you can pay
more and have the owner of the taxi register you immediately or
two, you can have him register you on the day you get sick or hurt.





2. [ ] No.
Education: Two years of high school
Current Occupation: Taxi Driver
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ 1 No.
Who started this activity?
1.[ You.
2. [ ] You and someone else.
3. [x] One of your family members.
4. [ ]Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [x] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [ ] Could not find wage work.
5. [ ] To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [ ] Big commercial businesses.
2. [1 Small commercial businesses.
3. [ ] Big factories.
4. [x] Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ I Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [1 Informal credit.
5. [1 Other.
Profile
I dropped out of high school after my second year to get a job
with Pemex, the mexican petroleum company. I was able to work
in this company because my brother worked there as a manager. I
worked there for two years. The reason I left Pemex was due to the
poor working conditions. In this job, my hands began to wear out
from handling different chemical compounds. Moreover, the
benefits and pay were not rewarding for the type of job I was doing.
I was working long hours in dangerous conditions for low pay.
Therefore, I decided to leave the company to work as a taxi driver.
I come from a family of taxi, drivers. My father and two other
brothers have been taxi drivers ever since they were old enough to
drive. One day I took my father's taxi out and came home with
more money than I used to make at my previous job. Six months
later I purchased a second hand taxi with a loan from my father and
became a full-time taxi driver.
The taxi business can be very profitable, but I have seen guys go
out of business almost overnight because of vehicle related
accidents. The majority of taxi drivers in Cuernavaca do not carry
insurance, which means they have to pay the other person in cash.
In this case, the person you hit can take advantage of you by
charging you well over the repair cost. When your at fault and you
have no insurance, you cannot go to the courts to settle your case.





2. [ I No.
Education: College graduate
Current Occupation: Restaurant Owner
Did you have prior training in this activity?









You and someone else.
One of your family members.
Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [ ] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [ Could not find wage work.
5. [] To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [ ] Big commercial businesses.
2. [x] Small commercial businesses.
3. [ Big factories.
4. [ Small shops and factories.
5. [x] Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1.[ Bank loan.
2. 1 ] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. 1] Personal savings.
4. [1 Informal credit.
5. [x] Other.
Profile
The amount of taxes one pays depends on two important factors.
First, it depends on who you know at the tax register's office.
Second, it depends on how you categorize your business. In my
situation, I declared my restaurant as a family business, which
means I only have to pay a 2 percent tax rate each year. However,
declaring my business as a commercial establishment would
increase my tax rate to 20 percent. Many business owners are not
aware of the loopholes that exist. As a result, some businesses
become vulnerable to bankruptcy. The key to having a successful
business, not only depends on management skills, but it also rests
on who you know.
Who are your workers?
The only people who work
of my daughters works on
for me are my three daughters. One
a full-time assisting me with the
management of restaurant. While the other two daughters work
after school.
Do your daughters receive a wage?
There are no direct wages.
After this brief conversation, Carlos was becoming impatient with the type of
questions I was asking. Therefore, I decided to end the interview. His reactions
led me to believe that there was some dishonesty in our discussion.





2. [ I No.
Education: Completed high school
Current Occupation: Sells import goods
Did you have prior training in this activity?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ I No.
Who started this activity?
1.[ ]You.
2. [ ] You and someone else.
3. [x] One of your family members.
4. [ I Someone else.
What were your reasons for getting
involved in this activity?
1. [x] Independence.
2. [x] Family tradition.
3. [x] Extra-Income.
4. [ ] Could not find wage work.
5. [To meet basic needs.
Do you pay taxes?
1. [x] Yes.
2. [ ] No.
Who are your primary suppliers?
1. [x] Big commercial businesses.
2. [I Small commercial businesses.
3. C ] Big factories.
4. [ ] Small shops and factories.
5. [1 Others.
How did you obtain money to start
your activity?
1. [ I Bank loan.
2. [x] Borrowed money from friends or parents.
3. [x] Personal savings.
4. [1 Informal credit.
5. [ ] Other.
Profile
I learned about this business through my grandmother, who owned
a boutique store located in a section of a Fayuca (flea market) for nearly
40 years. I started working at the store when I was nine years old. Back
then, the Fayuca was much smaller in size and there was not a variety
products. Today, the cooperative house has close to 200 shops. You can
purchase almost anything at this market, but once you buy sometime
you cannot return it. Therefore, there are risks involved when buying
goods in the Fayuca.. This is especially true with electronic products
because most of them are rebuilt. There are goods which are less risky,
such as shoes and clothes. Yet, what hold true for all good is that every
sale is final.
If you decide to sell merchandise that is produced outside of the
country, you have to be connected to a person who is dependable and
can provide reasonable prices. For someone who is just starting a
business, this requires money and network. Having capital helps, but
the most important element to this relationship is trust. My situation
is unique because I tapped into a network that my grandmother had
already established in Mexico City.
In this type of business you cannot afford the risk of not complying
with regulations. It is clear to local authorities that I am making a
substantial amount of money because imports usually yield a higher
profit. Also, in this type of setting your business is exposed to
government officials. They come around once a month to inspect
vendors. If anything seems suspicious, then your asked to show your
receipts for the previous months tax and utility payments. Most people
steal electricity and sometimes even water, but I choose not to do this
because I do not want to get expelled from the cooperative.
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